The Question of Palestine
by Nayef Samhat, Assistant Professor of Government and International Studies

Conflicts between nations are typically constructed around historical memories about who did what to whom and why. While such memories are necessary ingredients for any national consciousness, they often become so deeply held as to resist alternative and equally valid historical narratives. Nowhere is this more evident than in the enduring struggle among Israelis and Palestinians for security, statehood, and justice in the Holy Land.

The contemporary Middle East is profoundly shaped by the intrigues of Great Britain and France in the early part of the last century. Both Great Powers, in violation of British promises made to Arabs and Jews, divided the former Ottoman domains after World War I forging the contours of the regional state system. The territory of Palestine—the ancient land of Israel and the home of Arabs for centuries—remained under British control through the League of Nations Mandate.

The aspiration of the Jewish people to reclaim the land in Palestine as their national home is at the heart of modern Zionism. This 19th-century movement found its political expression in the work of Theodor Herzl. For Herzl the pogroms in Russia and events such as the Dreyfus Affair in France were manifestations of a deeply held anti-Semitism in Europe that rendered it impossible for Jews to fully assimilate into the national culture in which they lived.

As a primarily European movement, Zionist leaders found great sympathy and shared political interests with Great Britain. In fact, this connection allowed the Zionists to work toward Jewish statehood in Palestine with minimal regard to the indigenous Arab population. Hence, the immigration of European Jews to Palestine led to the formation of an administrative system to serve this new community, laying the early foundations of a Jewish state. It was, as Herzl and other Zionist leaders readily acknowledged, settlement and colonization by a minority over an overwhelming Arab majority.

At this time there also developed a national sentiment among Arabs in Palestine largely in response to pressures for increased Jewish immigration. This immigration provoked fierce resistance, most notably the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. But with the onset of World War II, Britain’s reassessment of its commitment to Zionism generated a violent response from Zionist extremists. Caught between two uncompromising national claims and exhausted by the war, Britain handed the question of Palestine to the United Nations.

Given the weakness and intrigues among the Arab states in the region, the Palestinian Arabs were in an untenable position. On the other hand, the Zionist movement was far better organized and effective politically, economically, and militarily. Thus, when the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan created a Jewish state on 56 percent of the land and an Arab state on the remainder (despite the fact that Arabs constituted approximately 65 percent of the population), the responses were a foregone conclusion.

For the Zionists, statehood was the culmination of the struggle for a Jewish homeland and, in the wake of the Holocaust, a vital moral imperative. By contrast, the Arabs drew the distinction between the tragedy of European Jewry and the Zionist movement, urging Europeans not to assuage their own guilt for the former by acquiescing to the demands of the latter. Hence, the U.N. plan was viewed as an illegal and unjust division of Palestinian Arab land, effectively legitimizing colonization.

Despite their success, the Zionist leadership remained keen to expand the borders of the new homeland. The unspoken problem, though, was the presence of Palestinian Arabs in the partitioned Jewish state as well as the rest of Palestine. A Zionist state, one created for the Jewish people, could not—cannot—absorb an Arab population sufficiently large to undermine its Jewish character.

This problematic history was the context of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Arab states engaged in a land-grab with minimal regard for Palestinians, while better equipped, trained, and highly motivated Israeli forces had three objectives: defend their state, expand its borders, and alter the demographic balance of the population. Herein lay the source of today’s refugee question. In the wake of the 1948 War, nearly 750,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were forcibly evicted from their homes by the Israeli army and various Zionist paramilitary forces. Except for a small number allowed back into Israel very soon after the war, these Palestinians and their descendants became permanent refugees in camps throughout the region.

A second wave of refugees came after the 1967 War. This decisive Israeli victory was a turning point in the conflict. Israel established an unparalleled degree of military superiority over the entire Arab world. Politically, the Arab defeat created a culture of insecurity, inferiority, and resentment that has shaped its political discourse ever since. And territorially, the expansion of Israel into the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai (since returned to Egypt) fulfilled a messianic vision for some Israelis of a “Greater Israel.” For others, expansion provided enhanced security and room for population growth. Indeed, many Israeli political and military leaders had actively sought to expand its undeclared boundaries since 1948.

Those Palestinians remaining with their land fell under military occupation. Israeli leaders, though, laid claim to their ancient land by establishing Jewish settlements, very often on expropriated Arab land. It is these occupied territories and the practices of occupation within them that are today the focus of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. The number of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip now exceeds three million people. In addition, there are millions of stateless refugees from 1948 and 1967.

While it is clear the present situation cannot hold, both sides find themselves with limited options. For Israel, its control over much of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, despite the existence of a fragmented and dependent Palestinian Authority formed after the 1993 Oslo Accords, comes at a severe human and moral cost. The annexation and incorporation of these lands and the Palestinians into Israel will create a bi-national state and undermine the very reason for its existence as a Jewish homeland. Another course is, as extremists argue, to annex the territories and “transfer” the Palestinian population to Jordan. Given these choices, it is obvious to a growing number of Israelis that Palestinian statehood in the occupied territories is necessary for peace.

Palestinians, on the other hand, are no match for Israel’s military power. They must settle—as the vast majority do—for a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip; it is their only option. The rhetoric and violence of Palestinian extremist groups, however, undermines the realization of their own national aspirations. And there remain Palestinian refugees scattered about the Middle East hoping to return home. Perhaps a symbolic return to Israel is possible, but they must reconcile themselves to the reality that they will never have the right of return. Their tragedy will endure, reminding those who care of how it is possible that the narrative of one historic injustice can create another.

Nayef Samhat, assistant professor of government and international studies, joined the Centre College faculty in 1996. He has written opinion pieces for the Miami Herald, Danbury (Conn.) News Times, and Lexington Herald-Leader, and he is currently working on a book about global democratic practices and international regimes.He spoke on the question of Palestine as part of the “Food For Thought” series at Centre.


Centrepiece
Centre College
600 West Walnut St.
Danville, KY 40422

Phone: (859) 238-5717
Fax: (859) 238-5723
E-mail: alumnews@centre.edu
or johnsond@centre.edu